Enforcing Surrogacy Agreements in the Courts: Pushing for an Intent-Based Standard by Ruth, Melissa
Volume 63 
Issue 6 V.63, Tolle Lege Article 1 
6-15-2019 
Enforcing Surrogacy Agreements in the Courts: Pushing for an 
Intent-Based Standard 
Melissa Ruth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Melissa Ruth, Enforcing Surrogacy Agreements in the Courts: Pushing for an Intent-Based Standard, 63 
Vill. L. Rev. 1 (2019). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss6/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
 
(1) 
ENFORCING SURROGACY AGREEMENTS IN THE COURTS: PUSHING 
FOR AN INTENT-BASED STANDARD 
MELISSA RUTH* 
I. INTRODUCTION: PENNSYLVANIA TAKES BABY STEPS 
Sherri Shepherd, actor and former co-host of The View, made headlines 
when she sought to have a surrogacy contract invalidated in a Pennsylvania 
court.1  Shepherd and her ex-husband, Lamar Sally, had entered into a surrogacy 
agreement while they were married, but the two divorced when the surrogate 
mother, also known as a gestational carrier, was pregnant, leaving Shepherd to 
pay $4,000 each month in child support.2  Following a petition by the gestational 
carrier, Shepherd then claimed the agreement was invalid and denied parental 
rights to the child.3  The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas enforced 
the agreement, and on appeal, Shepherd argued the court had “usurped legislative 
authority” by upholding the agreement where there was no statute on point.4  The 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania ultimately upheld the agreement, finding public 
policy did not prevent the enforcement of surrogacy agreement.5 
Pennsylvania lacks statutory law relating to the enforcement of surrogacy 
agreements, but most county courts have been willing to enter pre-birth orders 
recognizing intended parents as birth parents upon the child’s birth.6  Case law 
 
*   J.D., Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, 2016.  Melissa is an Associ-
ate at McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP in Philadelphia.  Melissa previously 
served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Mary Gibbons Whipple, J.A.D. in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. 
1. See Lizzy McLellan, Actress Takes Surrogacy Case to State Supreme Court, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter McLellan (1)], http://www. thelegalintelli-
gencer.com/id=1202746996445 /Actress-Takes-Surrogacy-Case-to-State-High-Court 
[https://perm a.cc/HRC5-M2X8] ; Lizzy McLellan, Justices Deny Actress’ Appeal on Surro-





2. See McLellan (1), supra note 1.  
3. See id.  Shepherd brought this action in Pennsylvania because the gestation carrier 
resided in Pennsylvania.  See id.; see also Surrogacy Contracts Directly Enforceable in Penn-
sylvania, BILL OF HEALTH (Nov. 30, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/ 
2015/11/30/surrogacy-contracts-directly-enforcible-in-pennsylvania/ [https://perma.cc/6RSN-
Z4SP] (stating gestational carrier “filed a petition seeking a declaration that both intended par-
ents were the legal parents of Baby S. and directing that their names be entered on the birth 
certificate” after baby was born and gestational carrier was solely listed on birth certificate).   
4. See McLellan (1), supra note 1. 
5. See In re Baby S., 128 A.3d 296, 306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). 
6. See Krista Sirola, Comment, Are You My Mother? Defending the Rights of Intended 
Parents in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER & SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 131, 141–42 n.68 (2006).  Finally, although Pennsylvania has no laws concerning 
surrogacy, the Department of Health has adopted a gestational surrogacy policy.  The policy 
permits hospitals to issue a child’s birth certificate bearing the names of the intended parents.  
However, the state did not enact this procedure by statute and therefore it is not binding on the 
courts.  
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also remains limited in Pennsylvania, but Baby S provided some guidance to trial 
courts for the future.  While the superior court decision seemingly solidifies the 
validity of surrogacy agreements in Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania missed an opportunity to set strong precedent on how to enforce these 
agreements when it declined to hear the case.7 
As the case law remains uncertain in most states, problems can arise due to 
jurisdictions lacking the laws necessary to protect parties.  Use of surrogacy con-
tinues to grow in the United States, but the law has not kept up with the trend.8  
The lack of legislation regarding surrogacy in most states has led state courts to 
deal with arising issues, resulting in inconsistent laws around the country.9  No 
relevant federal law exists.10 
Courts do not take a uniform approach to these cases.  The Shepherd case 
highlights the problems that arise from inconsistent regulation.  If this case had 
happened in the neighboring state of New Jersey where the gestational carrier 
resided, the outcome would have been completely different.11 
This Article compares the various legal approaches to surrogacy throughout 
the United States and asserts that surrogacy agreements should be enforced in 
courts using an intent-based standard.  Part II of this Article explains surrogacy 
and compares differing approaches to such agreements from different jurisdic-
tions.12  Part III provides a critique of relevant laws and asserts that courts should 
enforce surrogacy agreements and should apply an intent-based approach to de-
termining parentage.13  Part III also suggests restrictions on which agreements 
 
Id. at 141–42 (footnotes omitted). 
7.  In re Baby S, 132 A.3d 456 (Pa. 2016) (unpublished table decision) (denying petition 
for appeal). 
8.  See MAGDALINA GUGUCHEVA, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROG- 
ACY IN AMERICA 3 (2010), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/ 
kaevej0a1m.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2C3-YJTM] (explaining growing prevalence of surrogacy 
in United States and lack of regulation).  More and more people are turning to various forms of 
assisted reproductive technology (ART).  These fertility options have become an important part 
of today’s society for those who are unable to conceive a child naturally.  See Caitlin Conklin, 
Note, Simply Inconsistent: Surrogacy Laws in the United States and the Pressing Need for Reg-
ulation, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 67, 67 (2013) (explaining surrogacy has become more visi-
ble due to representations in popular culture and notable celebrities using surrogacy).  Surrogacy 
in particular has become a popular third party ART for women with fertility problems or who 
are facing high-risk pregnancies, as well as for same-sex couples.  See J. Herbie DiFonzo & 
Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 345, 351 (2011) (discussing clien-
tele for ART includes women and men with fertility issues, as well as single mothers and gay 
couples). 
9. See generally Conklin, supra note 8 (stating law varies from state to state). 
10. See Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States: State-by-State Interactive 
Map for Commercial Surrogacy, CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS, LLC, http://www.cre 
ativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map [https://perma.cc/X78Y-85UT] (last vis-
ited Apr. 30, 2016) (highlighting different laws throughout country through interactive map). 
11. See In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 269–70 (N.J. 2012) (Hoens, J., concurring) (finding 
surrogacy contracts unenforceable in New Jersey).  The concurrence is the controlling opinion 
in this case. 
12. For a further discussion of surrogacy law in the United States, see infra notes 98–
130 and accompanying text.  
13. For a further discussion of the arguments for and against surrogacy agreements and 
the use of an intent-based approach, see infra notes 160–84 and accompanying text. 
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should be enforced to keep agreements in line with public policy.14  Part IV con-
cludes by assessing the need to allow and enforce surrogacy agreements to better 
protect a growing class of individuals who want to become parents. 
II. CRYING OUT FOR HELP: THE INCONSISTENT STATE OF SURROGACY LAW 
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY 
While the practice of surrogacy dates back to biblical times, the practice has 
fortunately evolved into a more ethical option for individuals and couples who 
need help starting a family.15  In many ways, however, the law has failed to keep 
up with the changing technology, and courts must try to apply outdated laws to 
modern circumstances.16  Various state courts have taken different paths when 
confronted with the decision of whether to enforce a surrogacy agreement, and 
the limited legislative actions by state legislatures are equally as divided.17 
A. Information on Surrogacy 
Many different individuals contribute to having a child through surrogacy.18  
First, surrogacy involves the intended parents—individuals who plan to have the 
child and who will be raising the child after he or she is born.19  The intended 
parents may or may not be genetically related to the child.20  The next individual 
involved in the surrogacy process is the woman who carries the child.21  Last, 
surrogacy may involve egg or sperm donors.22  If involved, these individuals 
maintain a genetic relation to the child; however, sperm and egg donors typically 
agree to relinquish all parental rights upon donation.23  With all of the individuals 
 
14. For a further discussion of limitations that should be put on surrogacy agreements, 
see infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text. 
15. See id. (discussing surrogacy as option for gay couples or heterosexual couples 
where woman is unable to conceive or would face high-risk pregnancy); see also Christine L. 
Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a Commodification of 
Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 113, 116–17 (1997) (explaining evo-
lution of surrogacy from biblical times). 
16. See, e.g., DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 8, at 349 (noting judicial responses to new 
technology and arguing “judges and lawmakers should no longer rely on outmoded presump-
tions when crafting the legal norms for parentage and custody determinations”).  
17. See JESSICA ARONS, CENT. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 24–29 (2007), https://cdn. americanpro-
gress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/12/pdf/arons_art.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRE4-5ALJ] 
(categorizing different types of surrogacy laws in each state into bans, voids and penalizes, 
voids only, prohibits some/allows others, and allows but regulates). 
18. See Craig Dashiell, Note, From Louise Brown to Baby M and Beyond: A Proposed 
Framework for Understanding Surrogacy, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 851, 855 (2013) (listing all 
individuals who can be considered in determining parental rights as part of gestational surro-
gacy agreement). 
19. See id. 
20. See id. 
21. See id.  Once again, she may or may not be genetically connected to the child de-
pending on the type of surrogacy used; however, she is frequently considered the biological 
mother because she physically gives birth to the child.  See id.   
22. See id. 
23. See id.; see also Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law 
3
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involved in the pregnancy and birth of the child, determining who is legally re-
sponsible for the child upon birth can become challenging, particularly under 
state laws that fail to account for Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs), 
such as surrogacy, or that provide outdated notions of parenthood.24 
There are two different types of surrogacy: traditional and gestational.25  Tra-
ditional surrogacy involves a surrogate mother who is impregnated through the 
process of artificial insemination.26  This means the surrogate’s own egg is used, 
and therefore in traditional surrogacy, the surrogate is also the genetic mother of 
the child.27  The genetic father may be either the intended father or a disinterested 
sperm donor. 
Gestational surrogacy, by contrast, occurs when a gestational carrier be-
comes pregnant through in vitro fertilization (IVF), using either a donated egg 
and sperm or the intended parents’ egg and sperm.28  Courts have been more will-
ing to enforce gestational surrogacy agreements than traditional surrogacy agree-
ments due to the gestational carrier’s lack of genetic connection to the child that 
occurs when gestational surrogacy is used.29  Additionally, both types of surro-
gacy can be either compensated or altruistic.30 
B. Surrogacy in the State Courts 
Since the popularity of surrogacy began growing in the 1970s, courts have 
struggled with how to interpret the resulting agreements.31  While statutes specif-
ically regarding surrogacy are usually lacking, outdated statutes regarding par-
entage may hinder the enforcement of an agreement.32  Courts have typically 
taken one of the following approaches to determining parenthood and the validity 
of a surrogacy agreement: a gestational approach, a genetics-based approach, or 
an intent-based approach.33 
 
Contracting: A Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 395, 407 (2013) 
(discussing use of gamete donors to create cryopreserved embryos). 
24. See Dashiell, supra, note 18, at 856 (explaining courts are usually willing to favor 
intended parents with genetic connection to child but problems arise when genetic donors are 
used). 
25. See Mark Strasser, Traditional Surrogacy Contracts, Partial Enforcement, and the 
Challenge for Family Law, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 85, 87 (2015). 
26. See id. 
27. See id.  
28. See id. at 87–88. 
29. See id. at 88 (stating traditional surrogacy is less expensive but genetic connection 
to child may make surrendering the child more difficult for surrogate); see also In re Marriage 
of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 899–901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
30. See Jennifer L. Watson, Comment, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a 
Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD 
& FAM. ADVOC. 529, 532–33 (2007) (explaining some states allow surrogates to receive fees 
while others do not). 
31. See id. (discussing judicial split on issue of whether surrogates can receive compen-
sation). 
32. See e.g., DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 8, at 346. 
33. See Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 97, 102–09 (2010) (adding best interests of child as additional approach along with 
applying contracts principles). 
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1. Gestational Approach 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey famously became the first state supreme 
court to tackle the enforceability of surrogacy agreements in Matter of Baby M.34  
This case involved a traditional surrogacy agreement between the intended father, 
Mr. William Stern, and a surrogate mother, Mrs. Mary Beth Whitehead.35  Eliza-
beth Stern, Mr. Stern’s wife and the intended mother of Baby M, was not listed 
as a party to the contract, but the agreement provided Mrs. Stern with custody of 
the child if Mr. Stern passed away.36  Mrs. Whitehead’s husband, however, was 
a party to the contract, so he could rebut the presumption of his paternity upon 
the birth of Baby M.37  Mrs. Whitehead agreed to be artificially inseminated using 
her own egg and Mr. Stern’s sperm.38  After delivery, Mrs. Whitehead would 
terminate her parental rights, and Mr. Whitehead would rebut the statutory pre-
sumption of paternity.39  Mrs. Whitehead would then hand the child over to the 
Sterns.40  Mrs. Stern would then adopt the child.41  The contract also provided for 
Mr. Stern to pay Mrs. Whitehead $10,000 upon delivery of the child, and in a 
separate contract, Mr. Stern agreed to pay $7,500 to a fertility clinic that had 
helped facilitate the arrangement.42 
Mrs. Whitehead gave birth to Baby M on March 27, 1986.43  At the hospital, 
the Whiteheads acted as if they were the “proud parents” of the child, and her 
birth certificate listed her name as Sara Elizabeth Whitehead.44  Mrs. Whitehead 
soon realized she did not want to part with the child but initially complied with 
the agreement.45  The Sterns took Baby M home on March 30, 1986.46  They 
named the baby Melissa.47  Mrs. Whitehead quickly became distressed over the 
baby, and the Sterns agreed to let Mrs. Whitehead take Baby M for a week out of 
their fear that Mrs. Whitehead might otherwise commit suicide.48  The Sterns did 
not get Baby M back for four months.49  Mr. Stern filed a complaint to have the 
 
34. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); see Sirola, supra note 6, at 135 (stating Baby M “laid 
the foundation for the first judicial approach to surrogacy”). 
35. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235 (stating parties entered into written contract for 
agreement).  The Sterns sought a surrogate due to perceived medical risks for Mrs. Stern making 
pregnancy a “serious health risk” because of Mrs. Stern’s multiple sclerosis.  See id. 
36. See id. (stating Mrs. Stern’s exclusion from contract was most likely to avoid rele-
vant baby-selling statute). 
37. See id. (stating Mr. Whitehead was party to contract). 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. (“[The Infertility Center of New York] arranged for the surrogacy contract 
by bringing the parties together, explaining the process to them, furnishing them the contractual 
form, and providing legal counsel.”). 
43. See id. at 1236. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. (explaining Mrs. Whitehead broke into tears upon Sterns’s discussion of their 
name for baby). 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. at 1236–37. 
49. See id. at 1237. 
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surrogacy contract enforced and claimed Mrs. Whitehead threatened to leave 
New Jersey with the baby.50  The Whiteheads fled to Florida when the order was 
entered but were ultimately forced to return after the Sterns initiated supplemen-
tary proceedings in Florida.51 
The trial court found the surrogacy contract valid and enforceable and or-
dered termination of Mrs. Whitehead’s parental rights.52  Mrs. Whitehead ap-
pealed this decision, which ultimately made it to the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey.53  The Supreme Court of New Jersey overturned the trial court’s decision 
and invalidated surrogacy agreements where a surrogate is paid to surrender the 
child.54  The court found the agreement was contrary to public policy due to the 
separation of a child from its natural parent and because surrogacy had the poten-
tial to degrade women.55  The court stated the agreements conflicted with the New 
Jersey Parentage Act because the Act only defined “mother” as “birth mother,” 
and the court did not want to allow the birth mother to be compelled to terminate 
her parental rights.56  Thus, the court adopted a gestational standard to determin-
ing maternity and recognized Mrs. Whitehead as Baby M’s legal mother.57 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey had the opportunity to revisit the validity 
of surrogacy contracts with a gestational surrogacy agreement in 2012 but still 
found the agreements unenforceable.58  In In re T.J.S.,59 T.J.S. and A.L.S. entered 
into a gestational carrier agreement with A.F., who would act as their gestational 
carrier.60  A.F. became pregnant through IVF using an anonymous egg donor, so 
A.F. had no genetic connection to the baby.61  The surrogacy agreement provided 
that A.F. would relinquish parental rights to the child seventy-two hours after the 
baby was born but not prior to birth.62  To prepare for the baby, the intended 
parents received a pre-birth order from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Family 
Part to have their names listed as the legal parents on the baby’s birth certificate 
following A.F.’s renouncement of her rights.63 
 
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. at 1237–38 (noting inconsistency by trial court where trial court “clearly 
express[ed]” view that agreement was valid but focused much of the trial on what was best for 
the child). 
53. See id. at 1238 (stating court granted continuation of visitation rights for Mrs. 
Whitehead during appeal). 
54. See id. at 1240. 
55. See id. at 1246–51 (finding contract contrary to public policy that children should 
remain with natural parents and contract disregarded best interest of baby).   
56. See id. at 1241–46 (finding contract conflicted with “(1) laws prohibiting the use of 
money in connection with adoptions; (2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandon-
ment before termination of parental rights is ordered or an adoption is granted; and (3) laws that 
make surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions”). 
57. See id. at 1263.  On remand, the superior court the court held that Baby M’s “best 
interests will be served by unsupervised, uninterrupted, liberal visitation with her mother.”  In 
re Baby M, 542 A.2d 52, 53 (N.J. Ch. 1988). 
58. See In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 263 (N.J. 2012) (per curium). 
59. 54 A.3d 263 (N.J. 2012) (per curium). 
60. See id. at 264 (Hoens, J., concurring). 
61. See id. 
62. See id. at 270–71 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
63. See id. at 271. 
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After the baby was born, A.F. relinquished her rights, and the intended par-
ents were listed on the birth certificate.64  While no party to the agreement at-
tempted to fight this outcome, the Department of Health and Senior Services 
acted on its own to file a motion for the court to vacate the pre-birth order and 
remove A.L.S. from being listed as the child’s mother.65  This case made it to the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey where an equally-split court upheld the appellate 
division’s order to vacate the agreement.66  Once again failing to validate a sur-
rogacy agreement, the court based its holding on the statutory provisions requir-
ing a legal mother to be biologically or genetically connected to the child and its 
rejection of the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.67  Furthermore, the court stated 
that the validity of surrogacy contracts should be addressed by the legislature for 
the law to change.68 
2. Intent-Based Approach 
Baby M remained the most influential court decision on surrogacy for years, 
but eventually, state courts began to break away.  Another famous surrogacy case, 
Johnson v. Calvert,69 occurred in California in 1993.70  Johnson involved a ges-
tational surrogacy where the intended parents’ sperm and egg were used to create 
the embryo that was implanted in the gestational carrier through IVF.71  During 
the pregnancy, the relationship between the intended parents and the gestational 
carrier began to fall apart, and the carrier threatened to keep the baby if she was 
not given her final payment prior to the birth of the child, instead of the agreed 
upon payment following the child’s birth.72  In response, the intended parents 
filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of the baby, 
and the gestational carrier filed her own suit.73 
The Supreme Court of California resolved the issue of parenthood with an 
intent-based standard.74  The court first examined the relevant statutory provi-
sions for establishing a mother and child relationship, which allowed either giv-
ing birth to the child or a genetic relationship to the child to satisfactorily establish 
maternity.75  Because both women met this standard, the court determined who 
the natural mother was based on “who intended to procreate the child” and who 
“intended to raise [the child] as her own.”76  Thus, the court found the intended 
mother to be the child’s natural mother under the law because she initiated the 
IVF process to bring the child into existence—the intended parents planned to 
 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. at 263 (per curiam). 
67. See id. at 264–69 (Hoens, J., concurring). 
68. See id.  
69. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (in bank). 
70. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (in bank). 
71. See id. at 778. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. at 782. 
75. See id. at 780. 
76. See id. at 782. 
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bring a child of their genetic makeup into the world, not to “donate a zygote to” 
the surrogate.77  Additionally, the court also noted it felt comfortable considering 
the intentions of the parties “as expressed in the surrogacy contract” because they 
did not find the agreement to be inconsistent with public policy.78  Further, in 
1998, a California appellate court utilized the intent-based test again and found 
an intended mother with no genetic connection to a child was the legal mother of 
the child based on her initiation of the process and intention to raise the child as 
her own.79 
While the court in Johnson took a big step in upholding a surrogacy agree-
ment as valid, the decision rested heavily on the fact that the intended mother was 
also the child’s genetic mother.80  However, one year later, a California appellate 
court found a traditional surrogacy agreement unenforceable.81 
In In re Marriage of Moschetta,82 Robert and Cynthia Moschetta entered into 
a traditional surrogacy agreement with Elvira Jordan who would act as their car-
rier.83  After Jordan became pregnant through artificial insemination using the 
husband’s sperm, the Moschettas’s relationship began to deteriorate.84  The cou-
ple split within seven months of the child’s birth, and Robert took the child with 
him.85  Ultimately, the court determined Jordan was the child’s mother and found 
the traditional surrogacy agreement unenforceable.86  The court noted the result 
would have a “disquieting” effect on couples who cannot afford IVF, which is 
more costly than artificial insemination, or women whose eggs are not suitable 
for IVF, because they would not have the same benefit of the Johnson decision.87  
Thus, the court noted, “the need for legislative guidance regarding the difficult 
problems arising from surrogacy arrangements is apparent.”88 
3. Genetics-Based Approach 
Another approach courts have taken to determine parentage is a genet-
ics-based approach.89  In Belsito v. Clark,90 Anthony and Shelley Belsito entered 
into a surrogacy agreement with Shelley’s sister, Carol.91  Carol agreed to carry 
the Belsitos’s child for them, and she underwent IVF with an embryo created 
 
77. See id. 
78. See id. at 783. 
79. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998).  
80. See Strasser, supra note 25, at 93–94 (noting that holding did not allow for tradi-
tional surrogacy agreement). 
81. See id. at 94 (citing In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 
1994)). 
82. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994). 
83. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895. 
84. See id. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. at 903. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. 
89. See Spivack, supra note 33, at 105–06. 
90. 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio C.P. 1994).  
91. See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 761. 
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from Anthony’s sperm and Shelley’s egg.92  Prior to the birth of the child, Shelley 
spoke to the hospital about the birth certificate.93  Shelley was informed the 
woman who gave birth to the child would be listed as the mother, and because 
that person would not be married to the biological father, the birth records would 
indicate the child was illegitimate.94  The Belsitos brought an action to be recog-
nized as the legal parents of the child and argued they should not have to adopt 
the child.95  There is no evidence Carol ever tried to assert any rights to the child.  
The California appeals court concluded that Anthony and Shelley were the child’s 
natural parents because they were the genetic parents of the child.96  This ap-
proach has not been followed by many jurisdictions.97 
C. State Legislation 
Many states lack statutory guidance on the validity of surrogacy agreements, 
including Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.98  In some of these 
states, pre-birth orders may be granted by courts allowing intended parents to be 
listed on birth certificates; however, this varies from state to state and may vary 
even from county to county when states lack legislative guidance on surrogacy.99  
Some of these states lack any relevant case law in addition to the lack of stat-
utes.100 
Some states prohibit surrogacy agreements altogether.101  These states in-
clude Arizona, Indiana, Michigan, and New York.102  Up until this past summer, 
Washington, D.C. and New York had the strictest bans on surrogacy agreements.  
The Washington, D.C. law found all surrogacy agreements void and unenforcea-
ble and imposed harsh penalties such as a $10,000 fine or one year in prison for 
anyone who violated the law.103  Similarly, New York has strict laws banning 
surrogacy and implementing criminal penalties for those who enter surrogacy 
 
92. See id. 
93. See id. at 762. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. 
97. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West 2017) (adopting an intent-based ap-
proach); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West 2017) (adopting a gestational approach); 
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 8 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) (adopting an intent-based ap-
proach); Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (adopting a gestational approach).  
For a further discussion of the jurisdictions that do not follow a genetics-based approach, see 
supra notes 34–88 and accompanying text. 
98.  See KAREN MOULDING & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, SEXUAL ORIENTATION & THE 
LAW § 1:33 (2016). 
99. See CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS, supra note 10. 
100. See id. 
101. See MOULDING, supra note 98, at § 1:33. 
102. See id.; CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS, supra note 10. 
103. See Martin Austermuhle, D.C. Debates Reversing Ban on Surrogacy Agreements, 
WAMU (June 24, 2013), http://wamu.org/news/13/06/24/dc_debates_reversing_ban_on_ sur-
rogacy_agreements [https://perma.cc/42Q6-E4GT] (explaining strict laws and possibility for 
change). 
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agreements.104  However, the Washington, D.C. Council recently passed a bill 
overturning its ban on surrogacy.105  New York has legislation pending that would 
allow gestational carrier agreements (but not traditional surrogacy agreements) 
and would provide regulation on who can act as a gestational carrier and how she 
can be compensated, as well as other restrictions as to the enforcement of the 
agreement.106 
California, on the other hand, passed one of the most permissive surrogacy 
bills in the country in 2014.107  In line with its judicially-created law allowing the 
enforcement of surrogacy agreements, the California law recognizes the validity 
of gestational surrogacy agreements when certain requirements are met.108  Par-
ties must have separate counsel, have the agreement notarized, attest to their com-
pliance with the agreement under penalty of perjury, and file the agreement with 
the court.109  Other states with statutes permitting surrogacy agreements include 
Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and Washington.110   
Each of these states has its own conditions that a surrogacy agreement must 
meet to be enforceable.  States like California, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, Texas, 
and Utah, as well as Washington, D.C., only allow gestational surrogacy agree-
ments.111  Gestational carrier agreements are preferred because a gestational car-
rier arguably has less claim to the child she gives birth to where she does not 
share a genetic connection with the child.112  The proposed legislation in New 
York only allows enforcement of gestational surrogacy agreements as well.113  In 
a very recent turn of events, the state of Washington passed a law permitting 
 
104. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 8-122 (Consol. 2018) (“Surrogate parenting contracts 
are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void and unenforceable.”); 
see also Abigail Wilkinson, Gov. Christie Vetoes Gestational Surrogacy Bill in New Jersey, 
CNS NEWS (July 10, 2015, 11:36 AM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/abigail-wil-
kinson/gov-christie-vetoes-gestational-surrogacy-bill-new-jersey [https://perma.cc/99KJ-
BXFE] (discussing laws of New York and New Jersey). 
105. See Michael Alison Chandler, With new surrogacy law, D.C. joins jurisdictions 
that are making it easier for gay and infertile couples to start families, WASHINGTON POST 




106. N.Y. Sess. Laws 17-A, available at http://legisla-
tion.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills/2017/S17A [https://perma.cc/88PZ-UEVJ]. 
107. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2017) (validating and regulating surrogacy 
agreements). 
108. See id. 
109. See id.  
110. See MOULDING, supra note 98, at § 1:33; see also S.B. 6037, 2018 Session (Wash. 
Effective Jan. 1, 2019). 
111. See id.; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962. 
112. See Amy M. Larkey, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in 
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 611 (2003). 
113. See Surrogacy Parenting Agreement Act of 2013, Bill 20-32, Period Twenty (D.C. 
2013); S.B. 2547, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (N.Y. 2013).  
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surrogacy agreements.114  Surprisingly, the law allows both traditional and gesta-
tional surrogacy, contrary to other recent state laws that only allow gestational 
surrogacy.115 
Some states prohibit compensated surrogacy agreements.116  While these 
states do not allow fees to be paid to the gestational carriers for their services, 
many of these statutes allow the gestational carrier to receive “reasonable fees” 
for expenses such as medical, housing, and legal expenses.117  Florida, Illinois, 
New Hampshire, Nevada, Utah, and Virginia require intended parents to have a 
genetic connection to the child for the agreement to be enforced. Additionally, 
Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, and Virginia require the intended 
parents be married.118 
In the past few years, two separate gubernatorial vetoes have shut down leg-
islation permitting gestational carrier agreements with restrictions in New Jersey 
and Louisiana.119  Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana stressed his concern for 
the “ramifications of government-endorsed surrogacy contracts.”120  Governor 
Chris Christie of New Jersey has vetoed this legislation twice now, citing moral 
and ethical concerns with surrogacy.121 
The two vetoed bills provided guidelines for surrogacy agreements that are 
comparable to the legislation enacted in California and pending in New York.  
The New Jersey law would have validated gestational surrogacy agreements but 
required all agreements between parties be in writing.122  The law also required 
gestational carriers to be at least twenty-one years-old, to have given birth to at 
least one other child, to be represented by independent counsel, and to undergo 
medical evaluations, including a psychological evaluation.123  The gestational 
carrier would be able to receive “reasonable expenses in connection with the ges-
tational carrier agreement.”124  The intended parents also have to undergo psy-
chological evaluations under the law.125  The law did not require intended parents 
be married, but if the intended parents were married, both partners would be re-
quired to enter into the agreement.126  The law would then allow for the intended 
parents to be recognized as the child’s legal parents upon birth, and further spec-
ified that neither the gestational carrier nor the spouse of the carrier would be 
 
114. See S.B. 6037, 2018 Session (Wash. Effective Jan. 1, 2019); Ellen Trachman, 
Washington State Flips Its Anti-Surrogacy Stance, ABOVE THE LAW, (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/03/washington-state-flips-its-anti-surrogacy-stance/ 
[https://perma.cc/5SLJ-RMHH]. 
115. See Trachman, supra note 114. 
116. See MOULDING, supra note 98, at § 1:33. 
117. See id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2017) (allowing reasonable ex-
penses to be paid for gestational carrier). 
118. See MOULDING, supra note 98, at § 1:33. 
119. See Wilkinson, supra note 104. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. See S.B. 1599, 215th Leg., 2012–13 Sess. (N.J. 2012). 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. 
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considered legal parents of the child.127  In comparison to the proposed New Jer-
sey statute, the Louisiana bill had more restrictions, including restrictions for 
same-sex couples and single parents entering the agreements, and the law also 
“ensur[ed] that the surrogate mother would not be pressured into having an abor-
tion for any reason.”128 
However, since Governor Christie left office, the New Jersey bill has now 
passed the New Jersey legislature.129  Governor Phil Murphy likely will not veto 
the legislation.130  
III. SURROGACY LAW OVERDUE FOR REVIEW: AN INTENT-BASED STANDARD 
SHOULD BE USED TO ENFORCE SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 
Surrogacy arrangements remain unproblematic most of the time, but if dis-
putes arise surrounding the agreement, the outcome may be different depending 
on the circumstances surrounding the agreement or based on the state, or even 
county, where parties seek enforcement.131  Between the many inconsistent stat-
utes and cases dealing with surrogacy agreements, the state of surrogacy law in 
the United States remains difficult to decipher.132  Because many states remain 
silent as to the validity of surrogacy agreements, most intended parents take a 
huge gamble when they enter into a surrogacy agreement.133  This state-to-state 
inconsistency may cause additional problems where intended parents find gesta-
tional carriers in another state.134 
Therefore, states should enforce surrogacy agreements.  Enacting legislation 
to enforce surrogacy agreements would be the most effective way to do so, but 
courts should enforce these agreements until adequate legislation can be enacted.  
In doing so, courts should analyze agreements using an intent-based standard.  
States should create restrictions on how surrogacy agreements should be enforced 
to ensure all parties to these agreements can receive adequate protection from the 
state. 
A. Inducing Change: Surrogacy Agreements Should Be Permitted and 
Enforced 
Gestational surrogacy agreements should be enforced by states to ensure all 
 
127. See id. 
128. See Wilkinson, supra note 104. 
129. See David Gialanella, Gestational Carrier Bill Clears Legislature, N.J. LAW J. 
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2018/04/13/gestational-carrier-bill-clears-
legislature/ [https://perma.cc/QZL2-BN6R]. 
130. See id. (noting that the legislation “could be met with a friendlier reception from 
new Gov[ernor] Phil Murphy”). 
131. See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 8, at 356 (stating gestational carriers “rarely re-
fuse to relinquish a child after giving birth”). 
132. See Conklin, supra note 8, at 72. 
133. See MOULDING, supra note 98, at § 1:33. 
134. See Debra E. Guston & William S. Singer, A Well-Planned Family: How LGBT 
People Don’t Have Children by Accident, 282 N.J. LAWYER 36, 40 (2013) (explaining choice 
of law issues may arise and giving example from New Jersey).  
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parties to the agreement receive adequate legal protection.  Many anti-surrogacy 
advocates argue surrogacy, as a practice, should not be allowed and therefore 
surrogacy agreements should not be enforced.  One of the biggest concerns these 
anti-surrogacy advocates have is the risk of commodification and exploitation of 
women and children involved.135  However, surrogacy can also be viewed as a 
form of reproductive choice, empowering women to make their own decisions 
regarding their bodies.136  Furthermore, the risk for exploitation can be eliminated 
through regulation of the practice.137 
Surrogacy allows women to provide their reproductive services to other in-
dividuals.138  A main criticism of surrogacy is that it commodifies womens’ bod-
ies and the children they give birth to.139  Commodification is defined as “to treat 
(something that cannot be owned or that everyone has a right to) like a product 
that can be bought and sold.”140  These critics compare surrogacy to baby-selling 
or a specifically commissioned adoption, both of which are “universally prohib-
ited,” because they allow individuals to pay someone to have a child for them.141  
Critics also compare surrogacy to prostitution, claiming the women involved sell 
the use of their bodies.142  Yet women who act as gestational carriers do not sell 
their bodies or their children; rather, they are providing reproductive services to 
others who need them.143  Critics claim this distinction is minor and difficult to 
decipher.144  Unlike baby-selling, a surrogate does not get pregnant with the hopes 
of finding someone to purchase the child from her; unlike commissioned adop-
tion, intended parents do not randomly approach women and ask them to get 
pregnant to take her child.  These agreements are entered into by knowledgeable 
and informed parties who agree to begin the pregnancy process.  Additionally, a 
carrier is rarely the genetic mother to the child due to the technological advances 
IVF has provided.  This fact also decreases the connection between baby-selling, 
as a gestational carrier is not putting a price on her genetic material but only pro-
vides her reproductive services to carry another couple’s child to term. 
Due to these advances in technology, women can now use surrogacy as a 
way to pass on their genes.  Some critics of surrogacy claim the practice promotes 
 
135. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH 
TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS, 137, 140–44 (1996); see also 
Larkey, supra note 112, at 613–14. 
136. See Kerian, supra note 15, at 158–64 (discussing procreative choice). 
137. See Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 
16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 260 (2009) (“With so many participants potentially vulnerable 
to the forces of baby markets, we have an obligation to ensure their ability to participate with 
full understanding of the risks involved, as well as to be protected from the power imbalances 
and coercive influences of the market.”). 
138. See id. at 154–55. 
139. See RADIN, supra note 135, at 144. 
140. See Commodify, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/commodify [https://perma.cc/AAL3-6TAB] (last visited Apr. 19, 2017). 
141. See RADIN, supra note 135, at 137. 
142. See Larkey, supra note 112, at 614. 
143. See Debra Satz, Feminist Perspectives on Reproduction and the Family, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/ entries/feminism 
-family/ [https://perma.cc/XJ7Z-SZXC]. 
144. See Larkey, supra note 112, at 614. 
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a gender hierarchy by using women’s bodies to perpetuate a male genetic line.145  
Surrogacy had historically been an opportunity for men to pass on their genes 
through traditional surrogacy, typically when their partners were unable to con-
ceive children.146  Critics therefore argue surrogacy makes women “fungible in 
carrying on the male genetic line.”147  However, concerns relating to a gender 
hierarchy are no longer applicable due to gestational surrogacy.  Thanks to IVF 
and gestational surrogacy, intended mothers have the same access as intended 
fathers to use surrogacy to pass on their genetic line. 
Surrogacy also provides women with reproductive choice.  Many commen-
tators believe surrogacy enforces oppressive gender stereotypes, that women are 
“baby-machines,” nurturing caregivers, and service providers.148  In some ways, 
surrogacy does give away control of a woman’s body by allowing others to sug-
gest to her what she can eat, drink, etc.149  Even so, surrogacy can actually act as 
a way to empower women.  Surrogacy gives women the option to control their 
bodies by making the choice of whether to act as a gestational carrier for others.150  
Being able to carry a child for someone who is unable to do so can be empower-
ing, and helping someone to have a child may also be viewed as a rewarding gift.  
Many women find being a surrogate as a way to give back to others and enjoy 
doing it.151  This reasoning explains why some women choose to act as gestational 
carriers in a purely altruistic agreement.  Women should be able to decide for 
themselves if they want to partake in helping another this way. 
Further, risks of exploitation can be limited through regulation of the prac-
tice.  Exploitation presents a serious concern of commercial surrogacy, one the 
Baby M court expressed in its opinion.152  When individuals can pay large sums 
to potential surrogates, many worry surrogacy will become a practice only avail-
able to very wealthy individuals.153  Of particular concern is the notion that even 
wealthy women with no fertility problems may utilize the practice.154  Corre-
spondingly, poor women who need the money may be pressured into acting as 
surrogates for the wealthy.155  However, many of these concerns can be avoided 
through careful regulation of surrogacy agreements.156  Most importantly, limit-
ing agreements to altruistic surrogacy agreements with only reasonable expenses 
compensated, or limiting fees to very modest compensation, can reduce the risks 
 
145. See RADIN, supra note 135, at 141. 
146. See id. at 142. 
147. See id. at 142. 
148. See id. 
149. See Satz, supra note 143. 
150. See Larkey, supra note 112, at 616. 
151. See Amy Levin-Epstein, Why I Was a Surrogate Mother, BABBLE (2011), 
http://www.babble.com/pregnancy/be-a-surrogate-mother-surrogacy-story/ 
[https://perma.cc/99GB-VE5T]. 
152. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1242 (N.J. 1988). 
153. See Satz, supra note 143 (stating commentator, Elizabeth Anderson, particularly 
concerned with exploitation due to potential surrogate mothers having more emotional vulner-
ability than intended parents). 
154. See id. 
155. See id. 
156. For a full discussion of ways to restrict surrogacy agreements, see infra notes 185–
89 and accompanying text. 
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of exploitation of women.157  Many statutes allowing the enforcement of surro-
gacy contracts already include limitations on the expenses that gestational carri-
ers can receive.158 
Surrogacy agreements continue to be entered into around the country, even 
in jurisdictions that do not allow or enforce the agreements.159  Therefore, regard-
less of personal views towards surrogacy, providing legal protection to parties of 
these agreements remains important to ensure intended parents, gestational carri-
ers, and the children all have adequate remedies if something goes wrong. 
B. Courts Must Adopt an Intent-Based Standard for Determining Parentage in 
Surrogacy Agreements 
An intent-based standard most adequately protects the interests of parties to 
surrogacy agreements.  Not surprisingly, this standard favors the intended par-
ents.  The rationale behind the intent-based standard maintains that, but-for the 
intended parents’ decision to procreate and enter the agreement, the child in ques-
tion would not exist.160  This standard provides the most protection to all parties 
in the agreement because it always leaves the child with an individual who 
planned to raise that child. 
The gestational standard set forth in Baby M is outdated now that gestational 
surrogacy represents the preferred method of surrogacy.  The Baby M decision 
largely depended on the fact that the agreement was a traditional surrogacy agree-
ment, and Mrs. Whitehead had a genetic connection to the child.161  Many courts, 
including California courts, have refused to uphold traditional surrogacy agree-
ments but have allowed gestational carrier agreements,162 and most of the legis-
lation passed in the past few years only allows gestational carrier agreements.163  
Further, in a gestational carrier agreement, the intended mother may actually be 
the one who has a genetic connection to the child. 
Supporters of the gestational standard are typically opposed to the enforce-
ment of surrogacy agreements as a matter of public policy.164  Many of these 
arguments have been demonstrated through the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s 
decisions in Baby M and In re T.J.S.165  Proponents of this standard tend to believe 
 
157. See Abby Brandel, Legislating Surrogacy: A Partial Answer to Feminist Criticism, 
54 MD. L. REV. 488, 515-17 (1995) (discussing potential for exploiting women and statutory 
solutions to this risk). 
158. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2017).   
159. See GUGUCHEVA, supra note 8 (showing New Jersey representing 8.12% of the 
country’s surrogacy agreements, significantly higher than many other states, when surrogacy 
agreements are unenforceable in New Jersey). 
160. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (in bank). 
161. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1244 (N.J. 1988). 
162. See Strasser, supra note 25, at 98. 
163. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2017); S.B. 1599, 215th Leg., 2012–13 
Sess. (N.J. 2012). 
164. See, e.g., In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 265, 278 (N.J. 2012) (per curium) (Albin, J., 
dissenting) (discussing Baby M and stating “[w]e did not declare void as against public policy 
surrogacy contracts that protect the rights of the birth mother to assert parentage after the child’s 
birth” (citations omitted)). 
165. See, e.g., id. at 278–79; Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246–51. 
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that a woman who gives birth to a child has parental rights that cannot be forfeited 
under any circumstances.166  However, a woman should be able to freely contract 
and to decide for herself whether to forfeit her parental rights.  Additionally, the 
gestational approach may leave children without adequate legal protection at 
times.  If an intended father passes away during the time frame before the in-
tended mother can adopt the child, the child may be left without legal parents.  
While the surrogate can be recognized as the legal mother, more often than not, 
she does not want to be recognized as such because she had no intention of raising 
the child. 
A gestational approach raises equal protection concerns in most circum-
stances.167  Statutes and cases requiring a woman to gestate and give birth to a 
child in order to be recognized as the natural mother of the child or the legal 
mother upon the child’s birth discriminate against infertile women.168  Parentage 
statutes have long recognized numerous ways to be a father that extend beyond 
biology or genetics.  For example, the relevant New Jersey statute lists ten differ-
ent ways a man will be presumed the father of a child, including holding himself 
out as the natural father of the child, seeking to have his name put on the birth 
certificate, or simply being married to the biological mother.169  However, the 
only way New Jersey recognizes a woman as the natural mother of a child is by 
giving birth to the child.170 
Allowing an infertile man who is not genetically related to a child to be rec-
ognized as the legal father but not allowing an infertile woman who is not genet-
ically related to the child to be recognized as the legal mother is a violation of the 
constitutional equal protection guarantee.171  Infertile women are then burdened 
by the cost and timeliness of the adoption process, while men who are not genet-
ically related to their children can immediately be recognized as the legal father 
without going through the adoption process.172  While there are physiological dif-
ferences in how couples proceed when the man, as opposed to the woman, is 
infertile, these differences do not affect the basic situation that a woman who is 
genetically related to her child cannot be recognized as the child’s legal mother.  
A man can be recognized as the father of a child through marriage, even if he has 
no connection to the child; yet a woman who has initiated and planned a preg-
nancy cannot be the legal mother.173 
 
166. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1247. 
167. See, e.g., Dara L. Hoffman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-by-State 
Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
449, 454 n.16, 467 (2009). 
168. See id. at 467. 
169. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43 (West 2017). 
170. See id. § 9:17-41.  
171. See In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 269 (N.J. 2012) (per curium) (Albin, J., dissenting) 
(“Despite the obvious anatomical and physiological differences between the infertile husband 
and wife, once a surrogate knowingly and voluntarily surrenders her parental rights, their situ-
ations are not meaningfully different.  Denying the infertile wife and her intended child, as here, 
the same benefits and privileges given to her male counterpart and his intended child bears no 
substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose and abridges her right to the equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
172. See id. 
173.  See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(a) (West 2013) (presuming husbands of 
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Additionally, a purely genetics-based approach cannot adequately address 
the issues with surrogacy agreements either, as evidenced by the limited number 
of courts who have used this doctrine.174  An approach based on genetics seems 
like a reasonable option at first glance because it appears straightforward and easy 
to implement.  However, in today’s world of ARTs, this approach severely lacks 
merit.  In Belsito, the court addressed the intent-based approach but ultimately 
decided upon the genetics approach for three reasons: “(1) the difficulty in apply-
ing the Johnson intent test; (2) public policy; and (3) Johnson’s failure to recog-
nize and emphasize the genetic provider’s right to consent to procreation and to 
surrender potential parental rights.”175  The court recognized the gestational car-
rier may have some rights to the child but failed to address what would happen 
in those circumstances.176  Therefore, the court’s approach only works when, as 
in Belsito, the parties agree to begin with. 
A genetics-based approach does not serve any interests of the state.  This 
approach does not keep the baby with the biological mother, and it does not en-
sure the child has individuals to take care of him or her.  In fact, a purely genetics-
based approach could leave a child with no legal parents at all.177  Alternatively, 
the genetics test may determine that a gestational carrier who has no intention of 
raising the child is the legal mother.  In Belsito, the court recognized two tests for 
determining parentage, genetics and birth, but found birth should be used second-
arily.178  Therefore, if a donor sperm and egg are used, the two options for par-
entage under the genetics-based approach are the genetic donors or the gestational 
carrier who, in cases like Belsito, may not even be trying to assert parental rights. 
An intent-based approach adequately accounts for the best interests of the 
child.  Commentators assert that general family law principles should apply, and 
agreements should be enforced using a standard based on what is considered in 
the best interests of the child.179  The application of this family law standard 
seems logical because this is a family law scenario, and the interests of the child 
are always important.  As the court pointed out in Johnson, the best interests of 
the child will typically fall in line with an intent-based standard.180  Relying on 
intent ensures the individual(s) who decided to and planned for raising a child 
 
women who have been artificially inseminated with donor’s sperm to be fathers of children 
conceived through artificial insemination); see also id. § 9:17-41(a) (defining mother and child 
relationship based only on who gave birth to child); id. § 9:17-43(a)(1) (listing all ways man 
can be presumed to be child’s father). 
174. See supra notes 97, 107–09 and accompanying text explaining that a California 
court was in the minority of courts that applied a genetics-based approach, and that the Califor-
nia legislature chose to regulate surrogacy agreements instead. 
175. See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 764 (Ohio C.P. 1994). 
176. See id. 
177. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998) (ex-
pressing shock at trial court’s decision to find child had no legal parents and calling trial court’s 
decision “extraordinary”). 
178. See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 767. 
179. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 789 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) (Kennard, J., dis-
senting). 
180. See id. at 783 (majority opinion) (“[T]he interests of children, particularly at the 
outset of their lives, are ‘[un]likely to run contrary to those of adults who choose to bring them 
into being.’” (citation omitted)). 
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will be the ones doing so.181  This assurance applies even if the intended parent 
is the one who attempts to revoke the agreement.182 
Parties to a surrogacy agreement should not be permitted to rescind the 
agreement or change their intent.  This rule should apply to both intended parents 
and to gestational carriers.  Surrogacy presents a unique situation where the sur-
rogate has nine months to carry and bond with the child she is carrying.  Some 
critics of an intent-based approach argue a surrogate can never really know how 
attached she may become to the baby.183  A solution proposed by some critics 
would allow parties to enter into these agreements as long as the surrogate has a 
short time frame after giving birth where she can change her mind.184  Such a 
time period would not be in the best interests of the child.  The legal parents of 
the child should be known upon birth, so the child is always adequately taken 
care of physically and legally.  Problems can arise if the legal parents are un-
known for even a short period.  For example, consider a child who is born with 
medical issues that need to be addressed.  In that time period where a carrier can 
choose to rescind an agreement, who would be responsible for making treatment 
decisions for the child?  On the other hand, consider a scenario like the Sherri 
Shepherd case.  If a child’s intended parents are not held accountable and rescind 
the agreement, but the carrier never intended to take care of the child, who is 
responsible for the child then?  These circumstances highlight why the child’s 
legal parents need to be identified prior to the birth of the child.  An intent-based 
standard should therefore be used to interpret surrogacy agreements so the chil-
dren born through surrogacy agreements always have individuals who are pre-
pared to take care of them legally and financially. 
C. It’s Time to Push for Restrictions on Surrogacy Agreements 
Restrictions should be in place in every state validating gestational surrogacy 
agreements because proper restrictions would allow the state to regulate the ar-
rangements and provide protection to all parties.  Enacting state legislation would 
be the most effective avenue to achieve these restrictions.185  Until every state can 
implement these statutes, courts should also consider these limitations as they 
interpret and enforce surrogacy agreements. 
Perhaps the most important constraint would be limiting enforcement of sur-
rogacy agreements to gestational carrier agreements.186  Gestational surrogacy 
 
181. See id. (“Moreover, as Professor Shultz recognizes, the interests of children, par-
ticularly at the outset of their lives, are ‘[un]likely to run contrary to those of adults who choose 
to bring them into being . . . . Thus, ‘[h]onoring the plans and expectations of adults who will 
be responsible for a child’s welfare is likely to correlate significantly with positive outcomes 
for parents and children alike.’” (citation omitted)). 
182. See, e.g., In re Baby S, 128 A.3d 296, 300–01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). 
183. See RADIN, supra note 135, at 146. 
184. See id. 
185. See generally Melissa Ruth, Note, What to Expect When Someone Is Expecting for 
You: New Jersey Needs to Protect Parties to Gestational Surrogacy Agreements Following In 
re T.J.S., 60 VILL. L. REV. 383 (2015) (providing more detailed explanation of this author’s 
thoughts on ideal surrogacy legislation). 
186. See Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the Mil-
lennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-Traditional” Gestational Surrogacy 
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has become more prevalent than traditional surrogacy.187  In addition, eliminating 
the possibility of a surrogate being genetically related to the child removes an-
other avenue for states to find against the surrogacy agreement. 
Adequate regulations would also include restrictions on who can become a 
surrogate, requiring an age minimum, prior successful pregnancies, and medical 
and psychological evaluations prior to entering the agreement.188  Similarly, in-
tended parents should be required to undergo psychological evaluations to ensure 
they are fit parents.189  These restrictions increase the chances of a successful 
surrogacy arrangement with compliance by all parties.  Medical requirements and 
requiring past successful pregnancies would also increase the likelihood of hav-
ing a successful pregnancy. 
Statutes can also regulate the compensation gestational carriers can receive.  
Limiting expenses would alleviate many concerns regarding commercial surro-
gacy and baby-selling due to the exclusion of exorbitant fees.  Limiting costs also 
reduces the risk of women being exploited or coerced into acting as gestational 
carriers.  Expenses should be limited to those related to the pregnancy, which will 
encourage altruistic surrogacy arrangements.  States can limit compensation to 
the expenses they find acceptable and in line with public policy. 
These regulations would protect all involved by giving them judicial en-
forcement of the agreement consensually entered into before the process began.  
Regulatory guidelines would also ensure the existence of thorough and 
well-thought-out agreements.  It is also highly recommended that the intended 
parents and the gestational carrier be required to retain independent counsel to 
review the agreement.  Most importantly, regulations would ensure the child al-
ways has legal parents at birth who are prepared to raise the child and provide for 
the child financially. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The confusing state of surrogacy law affects many individuals: infertile cou-
ples, women facing high-risk pregnancies, and same-sex couples, to name a few.  
Actual disputes over these agreements are infrequent, and surrogacy can be a 
great way for individuals to have children with whom they share a genetic con-
nection when they cannot conceive naturally.  Individuals seem to be willing to 
enter into these agreements, even where there is risk, and even when they have to 
fly across the country to sign an agreement or to meet their gestational carrier.  
Allowing, but regulating, surrogacy would protect all parties to these agreements, 
which will occur whether or not the state intervenes.  A consistent judicial and 
legislative approach to surrogacy is necessary to make surrogacy more accessible 
to all individuals who want to start or expand their families and who may benefit 
from the practice. 
 
Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 690 (2000).  
187. See id. (“Fortunately, the advent of in vitro fertilization has rendered traditional 
surrogacy obsolete and unnecessary.”). 
188. See S.B. 1599, 215th Leg., 2012–13 Sess. (N.J. 2012) (requiring many of these 
suggestions). 
189. See id. 
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